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Abstract
We build two experimental markets to examine individual valuations of risk reductions with two risk-
management tools: self-insurance and self-protection. We find no positive evidence that the risk-reducing mecha-
nisms constitute a “frame.” Ambiguity in the probability on average affects valuation only weakly, and changes
in the representation of ambiguity do not alter valuation. Finally, unlike the results obtained by Hogarth and
Kunreuther for the case of market insurance, our findings do not provide a strong support for the “Anchoring and
Adjustment” ambiguity model.
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Since the seminal paper by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), several theoretical contributions
have analyzed the alternatives to market insurance which are available to an expected
utility maximizing individual who wants to cover against the risk of a loss. An individual
can purchase preventive measures that either reduce the probability of a loss (self-
protection) or reduce the size of the loss (self-insurance).
Very little attention has been paid to the comparative valuation of these two risk-
reduction tools in laboratory experiments or survey studies. The only such study we are
aware of (Shogren, 1990) addresses the issue of whether the risk-reduction mechanism
constitutes a “frame” that affects valuation. The hypothesis put forward is that, since
choice and valuation are often influenced by the frame under which the decision problem
is presented, individuals may evaluate self-protection and self-insurance differently simply
because they perceive them as two different ways of reducing risk, even when it would be
rational to value the two risk-reduction tools indifferently. In short, the value assigned to
risk reduction may depend not only on how much risk is reduced but also on how risk is
reduced.
To test this hypothesis Shogren uses a lottery involving a loss L in the bad state of the
world and a gain G in the good state, given an initial endowment W. He finds that the
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valuation of self-protection is consistently higher than that of self-insurance; this is in-
terpreted as evidence that the risk-reduction mechanism matters to evaluation. However,
the use of a lottery of the type (p, W 2 L; (l 2 p), W 1 G) does not allow for the isolation
of a framing effect due to the risk-reduction mechanism used. If the individual invests in
complete self-protection, i.e., in a reduction to zero of the probability of the loss, he/she
gets G with certainty, while if the individual invests in complete self-insurance, i.e., in a
reduction to zero of the size of the loss, he/she gets an expected payoff of (l 2 p)G. Hence,
any rational individual should value self-protection more that self-insurance.
This article attempts to make a contribution to the understanding of how individuals
value risk reduction through alternative risk-management tools. First, we modify
Shogren’s work in order to pick up “pure” framing effects (if any). By using a lottery that
makes self-protection and self-insurance indifferent to a rational individual, we test
whether the different frame provided by the two risk-reduction mechanisms really deter-
mines a difference in valuation. Secondly, we investigate how individuals value risk
reduction when the probability of loss is ambiguous, and compare this valuation to that
given when probabilities are exactly known.
The experimental design incorporates two markets: the market for self-insurance and
the market for self-protection. In these markets we try to elicit the respondents’ willing-
ness to pay for self-insurance and for self-protection for both risky and ambiguous lot-
teries.
The issue of a “framing effect” due to the risk-reduction mechanism is addressed by
asking subjects to evaluate lotteries of the following kind: (W 2 L, p; W, (l 2 p)). With
such lotteries the subject faces a loss in one state of the world but no gain in the other state
of the world. Hence, self-insurance that reduces the size of the loss to zero is perfectly
equivalent to self-protection that reduces the probability of the loss to zero. Any difference
in the valuation of the two risk-management tools can only be ascribed to the “frame.”
With respect to ambiguity, the design of the experiment is meant to capture three
aspects which are of potential relevance to the valuation of risk reduction:
1. The first issue concerns whether the presence of ambiguity alters the valuation of
self-protection and self-insurance, and whether self-insurance and self-protection are
ranked in the same order under risk and under ambiguous probabilities. For instance,
an individual may prefer to install a burglar alarm in a house (self-protection) rather
than put his valuables in a safe (self-insurance). But if there is no agreement concern-
ing the probability of a burglary, would he still value the purchase of the alarm more
than the safe? To test this, subjects are asked to evaluate ambiguous lotteries and risky
lotteries, where both kinds of lotteries are characterized by the same expected prob-
ability of loss for an expected utility maximizer.
2. We operationalize ambiguous probabilities in three different ways. One group of
subjects is asked to evaluate scenarios in which the probability of loss is given as a
point estimate, but not a precise one; a second group of subjects evaluates scenarios
in which the probability of loss lies within an interval; and, finally, a third group of
subjects evaluates scenarios in which there is a set of four probability measures.
3. Our third goal is to provide subjects with both low-probability and high-probability
lotteries. By considering a wide range of probability measures (p53%, 20%, 50%,
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80%), we test whether the attitude to ambiguity varies with changes in the reference
probability. This design allows us to test whether one of the “psychological” models
of behavior under uncertainty, namely Einhorn and Hogarth’s (1985) “model of an-
choring and adjustment” is a good predictor of valuations of risk-reductions. This
model has performed pretty well in predicting consumers’ willingness to pay for
market insurance (see Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1985, 1989, 1992), so that it is of
interest to determine whether it properly fits individual responses to risk reduction in
general.
In addition, we derive predictions for another model of behavior under uncertainty,
namely Gardenfors and Sahlin’s (1982,1983) “model of unreliable probabilities.” This
latter has been interpreted as a maximin rule and applied to a case in which the set of
possible probability distributions and their reliability is exogenously given. We do realize
that this procedure is a simplification of the original model. However, our aim is to check
for the percentage of respondents in an insurance/protection context who apply a maximin
rule in choosing their buying price.1
This article is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the predictions of the Einhorn
and Hogarth and of the Gardenfors and Sahlin models, while section 2 discusses the
experimental design. The experimental results and the conclusions are outlined in sections
3 and 4 respectively.
1. Ambiguity in the probability and the valuation of self-insurance and
self-protection: the predictions of two theories
1.1. Einhorn and Hogarth’s model of anchoring and adjustment
Consider an expected utility maximizer with initial wealth W who faces the risk of a loss
L if the bad state of the world prevails. Let p be the probability of the loss occurring. If
there is no gain in the good state of the world, then he/she should give the same valuation
to a reduction to zero of the loss and to a reduction to zero of the probability of the loss.
Consider the lottery (W 2 L, p; W, (l 2 p)). The maximum willingness to pay in order to
eliminate the risk (either through insurance or protection), P, is identified by:
U~W 2 P! 5 pU~W 2 L! 1 ~1 2 p!U~W! (1)
Assume now that the probability of loss p is not known exactly, but is ambiguous. If the
individual is an expected utility maximizer, since the expected utility is linear in the
probabilities, ambiguity should not affect premium setting by consumers who want to
self-protect or self-insure themselves. This holds as long as the mean of the probability
distribution coincides with the probability of the risky lottery.
The anchoring and adjustment model assumes that individuals evaluate an ambiguous
lottery by forming a subjective assessment of the true probability, S(p), according to the
following functional:
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S~p! 5 p 1 q@~1 2 p! 2 pb#, (2)
where p is the anchor, i.e., the starting value of probability which is adjusted upwards or
downwards according to people’s perception of ambiguity and according to their attitude
to ambiguity. The anchor value of the probability, p, is established according to the
individual’s experience and information set. q (0 # q # 1) is a parameter that indicates
the amount of ambiguity perceived, and b is the parameter that indicates the attitude to
ambiguity. In particular, b 5 1 means that the individual gives equal weight to adjust-
ments below or above the anchor. b . 1 implies that individuals attach more weight to
adjustments above the anchor, and the opposite if b , 1. b 5 0 implies that adjustment
takes place only below the anchor.
If individuals assess probabilities according to the anchoring model, the premium for
self-protection or self-insurance is identified by:
U~W 2 AP! 5 S~p!U~W 2 L! 1 S~1 2 p!U~W!, (3)
where AP is the ambiguity premium, and S(1 2 p) is given by:
S~1 2 p! 5 ~1 2 p! 1 q@p 2 ~1 2 p!b#. (4)
Assuming that the anchor used in forming the value of S(p) coincides with the probability
of loss in the risky lottery, and normalizing so that U(W 2 L) 5 0, we can divide (3) by
(1) and obtain:







If the individual is averse to ambiguity, he will be willing to pay a higher premium to
self-protect or self-insure against the uncertain lottery, i.e., AP . P. If utility is mono-
tonically related to wealth states, this implies that Rc , 1, and in turn that S(12 p) , (1
2 p). For each positive value of b, Rc increases as the value of p rises, and the individual
will eventually switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity preference. Each value of b,
in fact, identifies a unique crossover point from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity prone-
ness.2
Hypothesis 1. As the probability of a loss increases from low to high values, individuals
will switch from ambiguity aversion (Rc , 1) to ambiguity preference (Rc . 1). The
switching point depends on the individual’s b.
1.2. Gardenfors and Sahlin’s maximin model
According to Gardenfors and Sahlin’s model (1982, 1983), individuals facing uncertainty
can form subjective probabilities over the occurrence of an event that carry different
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degrees of epistemic reliability. Given a set of states of the world S 5 (s1,s2,…,sj ,…,sm),
beliefs about the occurrence of each state sj may be represented by a set of n probability
measures, P( sj) 5 (p1j,…, pij,…, pnj). Even if several probability distributions are pos-
sible, only some of them will be considered epistemically reliable by the individual. The
set P(sj) includes only those probability measures held to be sufficiently reliable. Let us
consider two lotteries f and g. Let xjf 5 f (sj) be the outcome associated to the occurrence
of state of the world sj if lottery f is chosen, and xjg 5 g(sj) be the outcome associated to
state sj if g is chosen. The utility of each outcome is denoted by U[. If lotteries are
evaluated according to the maximin criterion, lottery f will be preferred to lottery g when
the minimum expected utility of f is higher than the minimum expected utility of g:
f s g if min (j U~ f ~sj!!pij . min (j U~g~sj!!pij (6)
Where i 5 1,…, n.
In choosing the premium for self-insurance or self-protection, subjects are asked to
evaluate the lottery L 5 P(s1)U(W 2 L) 1 P(s2)U(W ) where s1, (loss occurs), and s2,
(loss does not occur), are the two states of the world. P(s1) denotes the vector of n
probability measures that are assigned a sufficient degree of epistemic reliability, while
P(s2) is the vector of complementary probability measures. We will consider the case in
which the set P(s1) is exogenously given by the experimenter. In particular, we assume
that n 5 4 and that p1 , p 2 , p3 , p4. If self-protection (or self-insurance) completely
eliminates risk, the best course of action will always be to invest a positive amount. The
maximum willingness to pay for complete risk reduction, AP, is determined by:
p4 U~W 2 L! 1 ~1 2 p4!U~W ! 5 U~W 2 AP!. (7)
This is equivalent to saying that, when choosing the maximum premium they are willing
to pay to self-protect or self-insure themselves, individuals give more weight to the
highest probability of loss in the set P(s1).
Hypothesis 2. Individuals who apply a Gardenfors and Sahlin maximin rule will always
be ambiguity averse, whatever the probability level.
2. The experimental design
2.1. The scenarios and the auction mechanism
In order to test the hypotheses put forward above, we ran 12 experiments, with 6–8
subjects per session. In six experiments, we simulated a market for self-protection, and, in
the remaining six, a market for self-insurance. In each experiment, each subject was asked
to evaluate eight scenarios, four referring to a risky prospect, and the remaining four to an
ambiguous prospect. The four risky scenarios were characterized by four different prob-
abilities of loss, namely, 3%, 20%, 50%, and 80%. The four ambiguous scenarios were
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characterized by the same four levels of “ambiguous” probabilities. In order to maintain
the same level of probability at any representation of ambiguity we adopted, the means of
the second-order probability distributions were 3%, 20%, 50%, and 80%.3
To elicit the subject’s preferences we adopted a computerized auction mechanism
which is a variant of the classical second-price auction. This auction was chosen in order
to provide subjects with an incentive mechanism capable of inducing truthful revelation of
their subjective valuations. For each market, subjects were asked to place a bid to purchase
the right to self-insure (or to self-protect). Before each bid, each subject was endowed with
£10 and was told that he/she faced the risk of a loss of £10 with probability p. In the
market for self-protection, each subject was asked to quote his/her maximum willingness
to pay to reduce the probability of loss to zero, given the size of the loss. In the market
for self-insurance, subjects were asked to quote their maximum willingness to pay to
reduce the loss to zero, given the probability of the loss.
One scenario at a time was visualized on the computer screen. At the start of each
auction, a clock was displayed on the screen, with a price steadily increasing from zero
British pence to 10 British pounds. Subjects were asked to press any key when the clock
hit the most that they were willing to pay, i.e., when they wanted to leave the auction.4 No
information concerning the winner of the auction and the individual bids were provided to
the participants at the end of each auction. When all the eight bids had been placed, one
out the eight scenarios was chosen at random. For that scenario, the first and second
highest bids were announced. The player who had made the highest bid acquired the right
to self-protection (or self-insurance) and was obliged to pay the second highest bid. The
rest of the participants played the lottery for real to determine whether the loss of £10 took
place or not. Subjects were paid £10 if the loss did not occur and zero if the loss occurred.
Before starting the experiment proper, subjects were given a hypothetical risky scenario
to help them familiarize with the problem and the auction procedure. This hypothetical
lottery was then resolved in order to show subjects how payoffs would be determined. In
this phase a risky scenario was deliberately chosen instead of an ambiguous one. If an
ambiguous scenario had in fact been chosen in order to show subjects how the lottery
would be played out, we would have been compelled to resolve the ambiguity, which
would have most probably generated a sort of learning effect such as to reduce the amount
of ambiguity perceived by the subjects. Since our interest concerned the relation between
ambiguous and risky lotteries with a one-shot Ellsberg type of uncertainty, we wanted to
make sure that the description of the type of uncertainty given to the subjects remained as
vague as possible, and that subjects did not learn about the resolution of the ambiguous
lotteries until after they had completed the evaluation of the eight scenarios.
For the same reason, we decided to set up the experiment as a one-shot second-price
auction run for eight different scenarios, rather than use repeated auction periods for each
scenario. If auction periods have to exercise market discipline, the lotteries should be
resolved at the end of each period. This implies that, at each round, the subject learns more
about the second-order distribution, which reduces the effect of ambiguity. At the same
time, as noted by Camerer and Kunreuther (1989), this learning about the nature of
uncertainty could be confused with other types of learning, for instance, that concerning
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the dominant strategy in second-price auctions, so that it would have been impossible to
distinguish the effects of market discipline on each of the two types of learning.
Several auction periods are generally adopted in the experimental literature as a solu-
tion to the problem of overbidding/underbidding in auctions. Repeated trials should help
subjects become familiar with the auction procedure and so learn the dominant strategy.5
In our experiment, however, the auction procedure is used to elicit subjects’ valuations of
both risky and ambiguous lotteries. These valuations, in turn, are used to calculate the
ratio of ambiguous to risky bids. Given this objective, underbidding/overbidding, even if
present, should not be a problem. There is in fact no reason why overbidding/underbidding
should be stronger/weaker or more/less frequent in a risky scenario than in an ambiguous
one. Therefore the ratios of ambiguous to risky prices should not be affected.
The next section explains how the ambiguous lotteries were played. The instructions
and examples of the scenarios are given in the appendix.
2.2. The definitions of ambiguity and making ambiguity operational
The design considers three representations of ambiguous probabilities:
1. “best estimate” probability, where the probability of loss is given as a point estimate,
but not a precise one; this is the original way of representing ambiguity used in
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, 1986);
2. a set of four probability measures, which is the original way of representing Garden-
fors and Sahlin (1982);
3. an interval of probability having as extreme points the extreme values of the set of
probability measures in case (2) and as mean of the interval the “best estimate” in case
(1); this is one of the operationalizations of ambiguity used to test the “anchoring and
adjustment” model in Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989).
In all three cases it was possible to make ambiguity operational by specifying a second-
order probability distribution. This was useful when we had to resolve one of the eight
scenarios in the experiment, in order to determine payoffs. The problem we faced was in
fact twofold: on the one hand, we had to describe an ambiguous situation in the scenario;
on the other, we had to make it possible to play the scenario for real. We tried to maintain
a certain uniformity, both in the description of the scenarios and in the way in which
ambiguity was resolved. In the description of the scenarios, we were careful to always use
the same words, and we always referred to the probability estimate (or interval or set) as
given by some expert hired by a governmental agency.6 Similarly, when we had to play the
ambiguous lottery for real, ambiguity was always made operational as a second-order
probability distribution for the probability of loss, although in each of the three cases this
second-order distribution had different characteristics. The “best estimate” ambiguity
corresponds to a second-order distribution centered on the “best estimate” value. The
interval of probability corresponds to a uniform distribution of the probability measures
inside the interval. The set of probabilities corresponds to a situation where various
VALUATON OF SELF-INSURANCE AND SELF-PROTECTION 59
Kluwer Journal
@ats-ss11/data11/kluwer/journals/risk/v13n1art04 COMPOSED: 05/06/96 3:10 pm. PG.POS. 7 SESSION: 10
second-order distributions are possible, but the subject does not know ex ante which
particular one will apply. Hereunder, we provide a brief description of how the three types
of ambiguity were made operational:
Best estimate probability. Subjects were told that p was the most reliable estimate of the
likelihood of the loss but that the expert who had provided the value was not 100%
certain. By doing this we tried to induce the subjects to anchor on the value of p.We made
this definition of ambiguity operative by asking one of the subjects to draw a ticket out of
a bag containing five tickets, three with the probability estimate given in the scenario and
two with values corresponding the the extremes of the intervals in case (3). The ticket
drawn determined the combination of black and white balls from which subjects were
asked to draw a ball. The anchors provided were 3%, 20%, 50%, and 80%.
Probability interval. Subjects were given a range (pL,pH) within which the true prob-
ability lay. The probability intervals provided were:
(1%, 5%), (5%, 35%), (35%, 65%), (65%, 95%)
The average values of these intervals coincide with the probabilities in the best estimate
scenarios. To resolve lotteries characterized by this type of ambiguity, we asked subjects
to first draw a ticket from a bag containing as many tickets as there are integers inside the
interval. The ticket drawn corresponded to the combination of black and white balls put
in the bag from which subjects had to pick a ball.
Set of probability measures. Subjects were given four probability estimates of the pos-
sible loss, (p1, p2, p3, p4), for each scenario. However, the reliability of each of these
estimates was not known. This is equivalent to saying that the second-order distribution of
probability was unknown. The sets of probability measures chosen were:
(1%, 2%, 4%, 5%), (5%, 15%, 25%, 35%), (35%, 45%, 55%, 65%), (65%, 75%,
85%, 95%)
Again, the mean value for each set corresponds to the “best estimate” provided in the first
type of ambiguous lottery described. To make ambiguity operational we told subjects that
loss could occur with four different probabilities (p1, p2, p3, p4) but that the experimenter
did not know which probability measure was the most reliable. We then asked one subject
to draw a six-face die from a bag containing 10 biased dice.7 The die was played and the
number drawn corresponded to a bag with a combination of black and white balls re-
flecting one of the pi’s. One of the subjects was then asked to draw a ball to resolve the
lottery.
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3. Experimental evidence
The data presented in this section was obtained by running the experiment with 82
students of the University of York in May 1994. Each subject was asked to evaluate eight
scenarios relating to the same risk-management tool (self-insurance or self-protection)
and to only one type of ambiguity (either “best estimate” or “interval” or “set of prob-
ability measures”). Each subject provided his/her valuation at each probability level. For
each experimental session, the scenarios were arranged in random order using the table of
random numbers. On the whole, four factors were manipulated in the experiment: two of
them were between subjects factors (risk-reduction mechanism, type of ambiguity), and
the other two were within subjects factors (risky versus ambiguous lottery, probability
levels). Table 1 presents the mean, median, and standard error for the various experimental
markets. For each risk-reduction tool summary statistics are provided at each probability
level for risky lotteries, and for each definition of ambiguity.
3.1. Sensitivity of valuations to the risk-reduction tool
Table 1 allows for a first check of whether, on average, self-protection is valued more than
self-insurance, as assumed by Shogren. As the table shows, there is no positive evidence
of a “framing effect” due to the risk-reduction mechanism used: a cursory look shows that
the ratios of mean and median prices for self-protection to those for self-insurance are in
the majority of cases not very different from one.
The Mann–Whitney U-test for independent samples was used to check whether the
valuation of self-protection was stochastically larger than that for self-insurance. The
results of the test (see table 2) show that self-protection is significantly larger than self-
insurance in few experimental conditions. In the valuation of the risky lotteries, there is
evidence of a framing effect due to the risk-reduction mechanism at the probability levels
of 3% and 50%. When ambiguous lotteries are compared, there are two definitions of
ambiguity in which we find some evidence of framing–namely, the “best estimate” and the
“interval of probability” type of ambiguity. For the former, the ratio of mean and median
prices for self-protection to those for self-insurance is always strictly greater than one, and
self-protection is significantly higher than self-insurance at the probability level of 3%. In
the latter, self-protection is significantly higher than self-insurance at the probabilities of
50% and 80%.
The risk-reduction mechanism was also manipulated as a within-subject factor for 12
subjects who participated in both experimental markets. This procedure provided us with
a control group for whom we could observe matched pairs of prices for the two risk-
reduction tools (see table 3).8 There was no evidence in the control group suggesting a
framing effect due to the risk-management tool: mean and median values for self-
insurance and self-protection are fairly similar, regardless of whether self-protection was
the first or the second experiment in which the subject participated. For each respondent
in the control group we also calculated the ratio of the bid for self-protection to the bid for
self-insurance. We found that two subjects out of 12 valued self-protection consistently
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more than self-insurance, and thus were clearly prey to the “frame” suggested by
Shogren.9 For the control group we carried out a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, but the value of
the test statistic T was always above the critical value, so that we could not reject the
hypothesis that the two samples were drawn from the same parental distribution.
3.2. Valuation of risky versus ambiguous lotteries
To determine whether subjects valued risk-reduction in the presence of ambiguous prob-
abilities more or less than risk-reduction with known probabilities, we calculated ratios of
bids in “ambiguous” lotteries to bids in risky lotteries. Table 4 presents the mean ratios of
Table 1. Summary statistics of individual bids
Asset market
Probability





Self-insurance 3% 66 34 75 38
(risky lotteries) 20% 255 202 127
50% 434 500 162
80% 650 709 222
Self-protection 3% 61 51 50 32
(risky lotteries) 20% 250 205 178
50% 517 521 136
80% 637 737 242
Self-insurance 3% 40 31 33 8
(Best estimate) 20% 216 181 112
50% 376 452 135
80% 583 700 216
Self-protection 3% 116 46 161 8
(Best estimate) 20% 228 227 170
50% 528 500 196
80% 745 812 230
Self-Insurance 3% 106 101 62 15
(Intervals of probability) 20% 292 264 96
50% 488 561 94
80% 538 511 228
Self-protection 3% 70 49 61 12
(Intervals of probability) 20% 279 214 135
50% 543 521 86
80% 833 824 40
Self-insurance 3% 61 31 62 15
(Set of probabilities) 20% 272 205 140
50% 482 500 216
80% 630 501 242
Self-protection 3% 67 65 33 12
(Set of probabilities) 20% 312 300 100
50% 495 516 107
80% 692 775 189
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ambiguous to risky bids for each of the two markets and for each type of ambiguity. The
table format allows us to observe whether on average ambiguity aversion (a ratio greater
than one) or ambiguity preference (a ratio less than one) prevails in our sample of
respondents. Also, the table allows a direct test of the anchoring and adjustment model. If
individuals behave according to the Einhorn and Hogarth model, we should observe
ambiguity aversion with low probabilities of loss and ambiguity preference with high
probabilities; moreover, the ratio of ambiguous to risky bids should decline monotonically
as the probability of loss rises.10
The first result that emerges from the data is that the mean ratios are, in the majority of
cases, different from one. The mean ratios, however, do not provide support for the model
of Einhorn and Hogarth. Nowhere do we find a monotonically decreasing ratio of am-
Table 2. Mann–Whitney test between risk-reduction mechanisms (one-tail test): values of U
3% 20% 50% 80%
Risky lotteriesa 1.78* .2 2.64* .058
Ambiguous lotteries
Best estimate 27 8* 16 16.5
Interval of probability 61.5 68 27* 16*
Set of probabilities 79 67.5 89.5 79
*Significant at the 95% level in that self-protection is stochastically larger than self-insurance.
aFor risky lotteries, the standardized normal variable Z is given instead of U, since for large samples the sampling
distribution of U approaches the normal distribution.
Table 3. Summary statistics of individual bids for the control group (risky lotteries only)
Asset market
Probability





Self-insurance* 3% 83 91 70 7
(1st experiment) 20% 240 209 77
50% 418 413 148
80% 666 765 226
Self-protection 3% 103 104 102 7
(2nd experiment) 20% 260 252 131
50% 497 513 174
80% 723 801 135
Self-insurance 3% 58 24 73 5
(2nd experiment) 20% 196 195 92
50% 414 455 207
80% 610 601 157
Self-protection 3% 61 24 66 5
(1st experiment) 20% 176 195 73
50% 436 455 169
80% 517 601 268
*The first section of the table reports results for seven subjects who participated in the self-insurance experiment
first and then in the self-protection experiment. The second section of the table presents results for five subjects
who played in a self-protection experiment first.
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biguous to nonambiguous bids as predicted by that model, whatever the specification of
ambiguity. Hence there does not seem to be on average any evidence of anchoring and
adjustment, not even in the scenarios that should encourage anchoring to the probability
measure provided, namely, the “best estimate” definition of ambiguity. The mean ratios are
always greater than one with low probability of loss (3%), which indicates ambiguity
aversion, but only in two instances do we find ambiguity preference with high probability
levels (self-insurance, best estimate scenario, and set of probabilities scenario). In the
other scenarios the mean ratios are strictly greater than one, as predicted by the model by
Gardenfors and Sahlin. To test the statistical significance of the difference between am-
biguous and risky bids, we use a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We find that the impact of
ambiguity is quite weak: as table 5 reports, the value of the test statistic T indicates that
in the majority of experimental conditions ambiguous and risky bids were derived from
the same parental distribution. These results parallel those obtained in two other experi-
mental papers in which ambiguous lotteries involve losses: Camerer and Kunreuther
(1989), which uses a double oral auction mechanism, and Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1985),
with one-shot choices.11
Table 4. Means of individual ratios of ambiguous to risky bids
Probability of loss
.03 .20 .50 .8
Self-insurance
Best estimate 2.24 .90 .90 .90
Interval of probability 3.74 1.10 1.10 1.15
Set of probabilities 2.5 1.12 1.32 0.87
Self-protection
Best estimate 1.62 1.47 1.20 2.25
Interval of probability 1.18 1.17 1.01 1.35
Set of probabilities 1.11 1.93 1.01 1.25
Table 5. Wilcoxon rank-sum test between risky and ambiguous bids (T values)
Asset market Probability of loss
3% 20% 50% 80%
Self-insurance
Best estimate T 5 10 10 7 13
Interval of probability 35 21* 34.5 18*
Set of probabilities 19.5 9* 30 39
Self-protection
Best estimate 3 10 14 1*
Interval of probability 15 4* 37 4*
Set of probabilities 31.5 4* 30 22
*Significant in that risky and ambiguous bids were derived from the same parental distribution.
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To explore further which model best fitted the data, we proceeded to analyze the pattern
of the individual ratios of ambiguous to risky bids at varying probability levels. This
approach was justified by the fact that the sample size for some of our experiments was
quite small so that the presence of outliers could distort the value of the means.12 Table 6
gives the number of subjects who behaved according to the predictions of expected utility,
the anchoring model, the maximin model, and the number of those who were consistently
ambiguity prone/averse. Results are given for the pooled experimental sessions. The
behavioral model that receives more support from the analysis of individual data is the
anchoring and adjustment one. This model of behavior fits particularly well the valuations
for self-insurance, while it receives less support from the self-protection experiments,
regardless of the definition of ambiguity. About 33% of the whole sample behaved ac-
cording to the predictions of the model. Some of the subjects behaved according to a
“weak” version of the anchoring rule: although the ratio between ambiguity prices and
risky prices did not decrease monotonically, subjects always displayed ambiguity aversion
at low probability levels and ambiguity preference at high probability levels. Sixteen
subjects, however, displayed exactly the decreasing monotonic relation between ratios of
bids and probability of loss predicted by Einhorn and Hogarth. Seventeen subjects be-
haved according to expected utility: the majority of them were students of economics.
Only two of our subjects adopted a clear maximin strategy, since their bids for the
ambiguous lotteries were close to the highest expected loss.
The last row of table 6 gives the number of subjects whose behavior is not consistent
with any of the two considered theoretical models of ambiguity, and who, on the other
hand, are not either consistently ambiguity averse or ambiguity prone. However, even in
this group we find some regularities in behavior, which suggest that these 26 subjects
cannot simply be dismissed as white noise. Table 7 tries to give a detailed breakdown of
their behavior. Several subjects (7) displayed ambiguity proneness with the low probabil-
ity (3%) and with the high probability (80%), as well as ambiguity aversion in between.
Four subjects displayed a pattern of behavior exactly opposite to that predicted by Einhorn
and Hogarth model, i.e., they exhibited ambiguity proneness with the probabilities of 3%
and 20% and ambiguity aversion at the probabilities of 50% and 80%. Nine other subjects
were defined as “ambiguity averse/prone with error”, since they behaved as ambiguity
averse/prone at all probability levels except one.13 If we keep these consistencies into
account, then we end up with only 6 subjects whose behaviour cannot be explained.
However, we feel very cautious in attributing these regularities in the subjects’ behaviour
Table 6. Number and percentage of subjects whose behavior is consistent with a theoretical model of behavior
under uncertainty
Model Number of subjects %
Expected Utility 17 20.6
Anchoring and Adjustment 27 33
Maximin 2 2.5
Ambiguity Proneness 2 2.5
Ambiguity Aversion 9 9.7
Others 26 31.7
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to any particular model of ambiguity. A direct test of other models (e.g., Segal (1987), or
Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), would have required a different design of the experiment.
Worthy of notice, finally, is the fact that, as in previous studies, (see, for instance,
Shoemaker, 1991), no correspondence is found between attitude to risk and attitude to
ambiguity: ambiguity aversion or preference were completely independent of risk aversion
or preference.
4. Conclusions
This article has considered experimental markets for two risk-reduction mechanisms in
order to obtain individual valuations of risk reductions.
We do not find any positive evidence of a “framing effect” due to the risk-reduction
tool, as assumed in Shogren (1990). With our experimental design, the two risk-
management tools provided exactly the same payoff. Under these circumstances the frame
was created simply by a difference in the words used. The significance of the “framing
effect” could, however, be affected by the context used. Therefore, in view of the impor-
tance that protection and insurance against environmental risks, product failure and work-
place risk have assumed in policy making, we think that the issue of the comparative
valuation of risk-reduction tools deserves to be explored further.
Concerning the valuation of risky versus ambiguous lotteries, although we find that
mean ratios of ambiguous to risky bids are always different from one, comparison of the
bids for ambiguous lotteries with those for risky lotteries through a non-parametric test,
shows a weak effect for ambiguity. This result is in line with those obtained by Cohen,
Jaffray, and Said (1985) and Camerer and Kunreuther (1989). Also, no significant differ-
ence results from the particular definition of ambiguity used.
Finally, given the similarities between the self-insurance and self-protection contexts
and market insurance, we have tested whether the model of “anchoring and adjustment”—
which has performed well in the insurance frame—was a good predictor of behavior in
our sample. We do not find any evidence to this end when we look at mean ratios, which
do not show the monotonically decreasing pattern predicted by that model and found by
Table 7. Disaggregation of the group “Others” in table 6.
Pattern of behavior Number of subjects %
Ambiguity adverse with error 5 6
Ambiguity prone with error 4 4.9
Ambiguity prone at p # .20 and
averse at p $ .5
7 8.5
Ambiguity averse at p 5 .03 and
p 5 .80, ambiguity prone at
p 5 .20 and p 5 .50
4 4.9
Unexplained behavior 6 7.3
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Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989). However, the analysis of individual responses shows that
some 33% of the sample behaved according to the predictions of the theory. Hogarth and
Kunreuther’s study did not use a market incentive to reward subjects (a flat payment was
adopted), while in our work we chose a one-shot auction. Further research should there-
fore consider the sensitivity of the performance of the model to the incentive mechanism
used.
Appendix: Instructions for self-protection experiment
You are about to participate in an experiment concerning decision making under risk and
uncertainty. The purpose of the experiment is to gain insight into certain features of
economic behavior. If you follow the instructions carefully you can earn money, but you
may end up not earning anything, other than the participation fee. You will be paid in cash
at the end of the experiment. The mechanism according to which you will be paid will be
explained at the end of these instructions.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants.
Communication between participants will lead to the automatic end of the session.
You will be presented with eight different scenarios regarding the same kind of prob-
lem.
Imagine that you are concerned about the occurrence of some event. If this event does
occur you would suffer a loss of money. However, you have the opportunity to take some
action at some monetary cost. If you take this action you will be able to reduce the
probability of the occurrence of such an event to zero. Each scenario differs according to
the probability of the occurrence of such an event.
Try to think of each scenario as a real situation.
For each scenario you will be asked to state the maximum amount you are willing to
pay to reduce the probability of the occurrence of such an event to zero.
For each scenario, you will indicate your maximum willingness to pay through the
following auction mechanism. On the screen you will see a description of the scenario.
Below the description, at the bottom of the screen, will be displayed a price which will
steadily increase. You will indicate your willingness to pay by pressing any key when the
price reaches the most that you are willing to pay (that is, when you want to leave the
auction). The last person to drop out will acquire the right to reduce the probability of the
loss to zero and she or he will pay the price at which the second-to-last person dropped
out.
At the beginning of the experiment you will be given an endowment of £10. At the end
of the experiment, after you have revealed your price for all the eight scenarios, one of the
scenarios will be selected with a random device and that scenario will be played out for
real. The player who dropped out last in that scenario pays the price of the second-to-last
person to drop out and hence she or he will be paid £10 pounds less that amount. The
other participants will play the selected scenario out and will be paid according to the
outcome.
The experiment is organized as follows:
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Step 1. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given a hypothetical example in
order to help you become familiar with the problem and the auction procedure.
Step 2. You will be given the first scenario. You will be allowed a few minutes to think
about it.
Step 3. The auction will take place. You will be asked to press a key when the price
reaches the most that you are willing to pay (that is, when you want to leave the auction).
Step 4. You will be presented with the other seven situations.
Step 5. At the end of the eight sessions a scenario will be selected at random and played
out for real. A person will be asked to pick a number from a bag containing eight tickets
numbered from 1 to 8. Each number corresponds to one of the scenarios. If number 5 is
picked, the experimenter will enter that number into the control computer. At this point,
the screen will display all the prices at which each subject dropped out from the auction.
If you are the last person to have dropped out for the selected scenario, you will have to
pay the price at which the second-to-last person dropped out. In this way you will acquire
the right to reduce the probability of the occurrence of the event to zero. Hence the last
person to have dropped out from the auction for the selected scenario will receive £10
minus the price paid to reduce the probability of the occurrence of the event to zero
irrespective of the outcome of the played scenario.
Then the selected scenario will be played out for real.
Step 6. The scenario selected will be played in the following way: there will be an opaque
bag containing 100 balls. The number of black balls corresponds to the chances of loss,
while the number of white balls corresponds to the chances of no loss. The proportion of
white and black balls will correspond to the various probabilities of the occurrence of the
event. The selected scenario will be played out for each subject separately. Each one of the
participants will be asked to draw a ball from the bag. After every draw the ball will be
replaced before the next subject draws another ball. A white ball results in no loss, i.e., in
a payoff of £10 for the participant who drew the ball. A black ball results in a loss of £10,
i.e., a payoff of £10 for the participant who drew the ball.
The mechanism whereby the lotteries will be played in the different scenarios will be
explained in greater detail at the end of the practice question. Please notice that after a
lottery has been played, you will be free to check whether the stated probability corre-
sponds to the combination of white and black balls inside the opaque bag.
Examples of self-protection scenarios
Best estimate. Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some event; an
expert, hired by a governmental agency, estimates that the probability of the occurrence of
such an event is 20%. However, this is the first investigation ever carried out; conse-
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quently, you experience considerable uncertainty about the precision of this estimate. If
this event occurs, you will suffer a loss of £10.
You are now asked to state the maximum amount of money that you would be willing
to pay to reduce the probability of such an event to zero.
Interval of probability. Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some
event. There is an estimate of the possible occurrence of this event; an expert, hired by a
governmental agency, estimates that the probability of the occurrence of such an event can
be anywhere between 5% and 35%. If this event occurs you will suffer a loss of £10.
Set of probabilities. Assume that there is a potential risk of the occurrence of some event.
There is an estimate of the possible occurrence of this event; four experts, hired by a
governmental agency, have each provided estimates of the probability of the occurrence of
such an event. These four estimates of probability are 5%, 15%, 25%, and 35%. All these
estimate carry some reliability, although you do not know if any of them is more reliable
than the others. If this event occurs, you will suffer a loss of £10.
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Notes
1. In an experiment in which individuals were asked to evaluate several ambiguous lotteries, Maffioletti (1995)
found that half of the subjects applied the maximin rule. In this experiment, however, only gains were
involved.
2. It can be easily verified that a necessary condition for the individual to remain persistently ambiguity averse,
whatever the value of the anchor, is that b 5 0. For each positive value of b, as the value of p rises, Rc
increases. If b # 1, the switching point from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity preference will take place at
a value of the anchor such that (1 2 p) , .5. If b # 1, in fact, the individual will give more weight to
adjustments below the anchor (1 2 p), and hence will deem the state of the world involving a loss more
probable. If b . 1, the individual can only be ambiguity averse for (1 2 p) . .5.
3. As will be explained in detail in section 2.2., ambiguity was always operationalized as a second-order
probability distribution.
4. For reference to this type of clock auction, see Harstad (1990). On the preference revealing properties of the
Vickrey auction in the presence of ambiguity, see Karni and Safra (1986) and Salo and Weber (1994).
5. Cf. Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) and Coursey, Hovis, and Schultze (1986). However, there is no
conclusive evidence of the existence of a learning process that eliminates over/underbidding (see Kagel,
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Harstad, and Levin, 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993). Moreover, Gregory and Furby (1987) argue that the use
of hypothetical lotteries that are not resolved could, rather than lead to learning, induce the building of
bargaining positions to be used in the non-hypothetical auction period.
6. By doing this, we meant to avoid problems tied to source reliability which might affect the valuations of the
scenarios used in Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989).
7. Numbers on the die go from 1 to 4 and stand for the number of probability measures in each set. The
number of times a number corresponding to a probability measure figures on a die gives the weight attached











Die A gives a weight of 1/2 to p1, and 1/6 to each of p2,p3, and p4, Each set of weights is equally probable.
8. More precisely, five subjects took part in the self-insurance experiment first and then in the self-protection
experiment, while seven subjects participated in the two experiments in the reverse order.
9. One of them played the self-protection experiment as his/her second experiment, while the other played
self-protection before self-insurance.
10. Also, this table format allows a direct comparison with the results obtained in Hogarth and Kunreuther
(1989), who use the same type of table and obtain strong support for the Einhorn and Hogarth model.
11. Eisenberger and Weber (1995) find a slightly stronger ambiguity effect in a experiment using a one-shot
design.
12. Tables 1 and 4 were also constructed eliminating the highest bid from each auction that we run. However,
in table 1 this did not eliminate the disparity between mean self-protection and mean self-insurance prices
wherever this difference existed. Likewise, elimination of the highest bid did not eliminate the presence of
ratios greater than one in table 4, which were due to the presence of extremely ambiguity averse individuals.
13. Provided the ratio of ambiguous to risky bid at that probability is not sensibly different from one.
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